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ABSTRACT 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in MedImmune v. 
Genentech shifts the balance of power in license agreements from 
patent holders to their licensees.  This iBrief outlines the potential 
implications of the new rules on all stages of patent prosecution 
and protection.  Further, it evaluates remedial contract provisions 
patent holders may include in future license agreements and how 
these provisions may mitigate the decision’s effects on preexisting 
commercial relationships. 
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 On January 9, 2007, the Supreme Court supplied patent licensees 
with a new weapon for their arsenals with its holding in MedImmune v. 
Genentech.2  In 1997, the petitioner, drug manufacturer MedImmune, 
entered into a license agreement with the respondent, patent holder 
Genentech, which covered Cabilly I, an existing patent, and Cabilly II, a 
pending patent application.3  In 2001, Genentech attempted to instate 
royalty obligations on Cabilly II, which had then matured into a patent.4  
MedImmune sought declaratory relief but was denied standing under the 
Federal Circuit’s requirement that “a licensee must, at a minimum, stop 
paying royalties . . . before bringing suit to challenge the validity or scope 
of the licensed patent.”5  On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court ruled 8-1 
that MedImmune 
. . . was not required, insofar as Article III is concerned, to break or 
terminate its 1997 license agreement before seeking a declaratory 
judgment in federal court that the underlying patent is invalid, 
                                                     
1 J.D. candidate, Duke University School of Law, 2008; B.S., Civil Engineering 
and Architecture, Columbia University, 2005.  This article has benefited from 
the insightful suggestions of Kenneth D. Sibley of Myers Bigel Sibley & 
Sajovec and Senior Lecturing Fellow at Duke University School of Law.  All 
errors and omissions are the author’s alone. 
2 MedImmune v. Genentech, 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007). 
3 Id. at 767-68. 
4 Id. 
5 Gen-Probe v. Vysis, 359 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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unenforceable, or not infringed.  The Court of Appeals erred in 
affirming the dismissal of this action for lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction.6 
¶2 The decision did not surprise those familiar with the Roberts 
Court’s skepticism toward patent rights and, correspondingly, the Federal 
Circuit’s formalistic efforts to protect those rights.7  MedImmune could 
potentially “clear[] the way for timely challenges to junk patents that 
impede innovation,” but the stability of patents and accessibility of licenses 
ultimately depends on the willingness of patent holders to license their 
rights and the likelihood that licensees will challenge those rights.8  This 
iBrief identifies and evaluates potential strategies patent holders may use to 
offset the likelihood of declaratory judgment actions against their patent 
rights. 
I. THE NEW RULES OF PATENT LICENSING 
A. The Supreme Court’s Ruling 
¶3 Before MedImmune, patent holders and their licensees used licenses 
as a means to avoid litigation; in this respect, a license was analogous to a 
settlement agreement between parties seeking to preempt the threat of 
litigation.9  A potential licensee “wanting to engage in conduct arguably 
                                                     
6 MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 777. 
7 See Lorelei Ritchie de Larena, Re-evaluating Declaratory Judgment 
Jurisdiction in Intellectual Property Disputes, 83 IND. L.J. 1, at 21 (2007); Greg 
Stohr, Patent Case Creates Unusual Allies, THE SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 20, 2007, 
at C3 (“The way they have been trending the last few years . . . is removing the 
power from the patents . . . . [T]he justices repeatedly slammed a test used by the 
Federal Circuit to limit patent challenges . . . . Scalia called the test 
‘gobbledygook,’ while Roberts said it was ‘worse than meaningless.”); Supreme 
Court Rules on Case or Controversy Requirement in Patent Litigation, TECH 
LAW JOURNAL, Jan. 1, 2007, 
http://www.techlawjournal.com/home/newsbriefs/2007/01b.asp (last visited 
Nov. 12, 2007) (“Yet again, the Supreme Court has thrown out a ruling that 
perpetuates dysfunctions in the patent system . . . [t]his marks yet another 
occasion where the Court has clamped down on the Federal Circuit’s wayward 
jurisprudence.”). 
8 Supreme Court Rules on Case or Controversy Requirement in Patent 
Litigation, supra note 7. 
9 See MedImmune v. Centocor, 409 F.3d 1376, 1379 (2005) (“[A] license is, by 
its nature, an agreement not to litigate. A licensor agrees to receive royalties or 
other consideration from the licensee in exchange for a covenant not to sue or 
disturb the licensee’s activities.”); Brief for The Trustees of Columbia 
University in the City of New York et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at 10, MedImmune v. Genentech, 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007) (No. 05-
608) [hereinafter Columbia Brief] (“Indeed, the very point of the agreement is to 
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covered by a patent” would enter into negotiations with the patent holder, 
wherein they would express their views regarding “whether the conduct is 
covered and whether the patent is a valid, enforceable one.”10  The 
agreement seems beneficial for both parties: the licensee is free to use the 
patent without fearing an infringement suit, while the patentee profits from 
his invention without having to market it himself.11  However, prior to 
MedImmune, a licensee seeking to challenge the licensed patent faced bleak 
options under the Federal Circuit’s standing requirement: continue paying 
royalties without challenging the patent, or breach the license agreement 
and risk an infringement suit.  In these situations, licensees such as 
MedImmune, who lack the financial capital to cover the potential damages 
from an infringement suit, found themselves trapped into royalty 
payments.12 
¶4 Now a licensee can bring an action against its licensor for a 
declaratory judgment of invalidity or noninfringement without breaking its 
license and risking an infringement suit.13  In addition to the ability to 
protect itself from the risk of treble damages, licensees also gain the ability 
to preemptively engage the patent holder rather than having to respond to an 
infringement suit with an invalidity or noninfringement counterclaim.14 
B. Issues for Lower Courts to Decide 
¶5 By answering only the question of whether a licensee is required, 
“insofar as Article III is concerned, to break or terminate its . . . license 
agreement before seeking a declaratory judgment in federal court that the 
underlying patent is invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed,”15 the Court’s 
                                                                                                                       
settle the dispute and to put the technology into practice without wasteful 
expenditures on judicial processes.”). 
10 Columbia Brief, supra note 9, at 10. 
11 See id. (“The licensee gets substantial benefits: the right to practice the patent 
free of litigation threat; the freedom to do so immediately without awaiting years 
of litigation; and a negotiated royalty rate reduced from the patentee’s initial 
offer to reflect any perceived uncertainty over issues of patent validity, 
enforceability, and coverage.”). 
12 MedImmune, for example, feared that if it breached the agreement it may be 
liable for “treble damage and attorney’s fees, and . . . more than 80 percent of its 
revenue.”  MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 766. 
13 Id. at 774 n.11. 
14 Qin Shi, Reexamination, Opposition, or Litigation? Legislative Efforts to 
Create a Post-Grant Patent Quality Control System, 31 AIPLA Q. J. 433, 465 
(2003). 
15 MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 777. 
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narrow holding in MedImmune may have “potentially raise[d] more issues 
than it resolve[d].”16 
1. Can licensees contractually reduce the risk of declaratory judgments? 
¶6 MedImmune leaves patent owners wondering whether or not they 
can contract around their potential vulnerability to patent challenges by 
inserting provisions in their license agreements that prohibit or deter 
licensees from raising those challenges.  They “are likely to try a number of 
different strategies in . . . negotiations and in litigation until . . . the 
questions raised by MedImmune are resolved” by the lower courts.17  These 
strategies and their potential likelihood of success are discussed further in 
Section II of this iBrief. 
2. Are licensees liable for royalty payments while challenges are pending? 
¶7 In MedImmune, the Court acknowledged the existence of the above 
question without expressing an opinion.18  The Court noted previously that 
requiring licensees “to continue to pay royalties while challenging a patent’s 
validity in the courts” would undermine “the strong federal policy favoring 
the full and free use of ideas in the public domain.”19  Even where a contract 
required “payment of royalties until the patent was shown to be invalid,” the 
Court allowed the licensee to avoid payment of “all royalties accruing after 
issuance of the patent” if the patent was found to be invalid.20  While 
                                                     
16 George C. Best, U.S. Supreme Court Decision Permits Patent Challenges by 
Licensees, MONDAQ, Jan. 24, 2007, 
http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=45844; see also Pete Yost, Court 
Rules in Favor of MedImmune, CBS NEWS, Jan. 9, 2007, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/01/09/ap/business/mainD8MHSGPO1.sht
ml (quoting George C. Best as saying MedImmune “opens the courthouse door 
and lets people come in and possibly allows them to challenge, but it also leaves 
many questions unanswered”). 
17 Charles S. Barquist and Jason A. Crotty, MedImmune v. Genentech: The 
Supreme Court Upends the Federal Circuit’s Declaratory Judgment 
Jurisprudence, U.S. SUPREME COURT MONITOR, Jan. 29, 2007, 
http://www.law.com/jsp/scm/PubArticleSCM.jsp?id=1169806060399. 
18 MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 775-76.  Some commentators are confident, 
regardless, that MedImmune would indeed be liable for all royalty payments 
before the patent is found invalid or unenforceable.  Josh Rosenkranz, Patricia 
Thayer, and Jeffrey Hsu, MedImmune v. Genentech Ruling Creates Patent 
Licensing Uncertainty, HELLER EHRMAN LLP, Jan. 29, 2007, 
http://www.hewm.com/en/news/industry/industry_3427.html (“Under the 
prevailing case law, even if the issue of Cabilly II’s validity is decided on the 
merits on remand, MedImmune will not be entitled to recover any royalties paid 
before a final judgment of patent invalidity or unenforceability is rendered.”). 
19 Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 673-74 (1969). 
20 Id. (emphasis added). 
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Supreme Court precedent seems to weigh against patent holders’ ability to 
use license terms to enforce royalty payments throughout patent challenges, 
Section II addresses alternative ways patent holders can secure continued 
compensation in the face of a challenge. 
3. When is discretionary dismissal appropriate? 
¶8 Even though the Supreme Court ruled that MedImmune met all 
standing requirements, it left “equitable, prudential, and policy arguments in 
favor of such a discretionary dismissal for the lower courts’ consideration 
on remand.”21  The Declaratory Judgment Act specifically entrusts courts 
with discretion on whether to hear declaratory suits. 22  Thus, when deciding 
whether to grant standing to royalty-paying licensees, lower courts will 
defer to a variety of indeterminate factors in evaluating “whether the 
investment of time and resources will be worthwhile.”23 
¶9 A court may consider, for example, the maturity of the subject 
patent when the license agreement was issued.  Most likely, it would be less 
sympathetic toward the licensee who failed to take an opportunity to 
examine the licensed patent before entering the agreement than the licensee 
who lacked that opportunity.24  A licensee challenging a patent that was still 
pending when the license was executed, like MedImmune, would fall into 
the latter category.  Courts may be inclined to adjudicate such a case, given 
the indeterminate nature of the patent and the licensee’s lack of opportunity 
to examine it before entering the agreement.25 
II. GETTING AROUND MEDIMMUNE 
¶10 Post-MedImmune license agreements are forecasted to include 
boilerplate provisions prohibiting licensees from challenging underlying 
patents, particularly because “the Supreme Court has now held that if the 
license agreement is silent on the subject, a licensee will be able to 
challenge the patent in federal court without breaching the license 
                                                     
21 Gregory Castanias, Douglas R. Cole & Stephen J. Goodman, Another Change 
in U.S. Patent Law: U.S. Supreme Court Rules that Patent Licensees May Seek 
Declaratory Judgments in Patent-License Cases Without First Breaching the 
License, MONDAQ, Jan. 31, 2007, 
http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=45940. 
22 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2006). 
23 Serco Services Co., v. Kelley Co., 51 F.3d 1037, 1217-18 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
24 See Columbia Brief, supra note 9, at 29 (“For many licenses, the patent . . . is 
available for the public to examine . . . before the parties commence their license 
negotiations. The prospective licensee thus has the ability to study the patent’s 
claims, including its validity and scope, and to obtain an opinion of counsel.”). 
25 See MedImmune v. Genentech, 127 S. Ct. 764, 766 (2007). 
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agreement.” 26  However, whether any “specific language restricting the 
ability of [a] licensee to challenge the patent while still in good standing . . . 
would be enforceable remains to be seen.”27  Thus, if courts are hesitant to 
enforce blanket prohibitions against licensee challenges, patent holders may 
instead try to “discourage licensees from challenging their patents without 
creating an outright ban on such a challenge.”28 
A. Possible Contract Provisions 
1. Prohibiting declaratory judgment actions 
¶11 Patent owners may feel unduly restricted “if a licensee can sue for a 
declaratory judgment of invalidity on a patent they are licensing without 
actually breaching the licensing agreement to create [an] infringement.”  
Thus, a patent holder may include a provision in the license agreement that 
“in exchange for the grant of the license no lawsuit can be brought 
challenging the validity of the relevant patent.”29  Under such a provision, a 
licensee’s challenge against the licensed patent amounts to a material breach 
                                                     
26 Russell S. Timm & Brian McQuillen, Patent Licensee in Good Standing Can 
Challenge Patent Under Declaratory Judgment Act, MONDAQ, Jan. 12, 2007, 
http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=45562&searchresults=1; see also 
MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 776 (“[I]t is not clear where the prohibition against 
challenging the validity of the patents can be found . . . [and] the contract, 
properly interpreted, does not prevent it from challenging the patents . . . .”); 
Paul Maple, Rick Sanders and Justin McNaughton, Patent Licensees Have 
Standing to Challenge the Validity of a Licensed Patent, MONDAQ, Feb. 21, 
2007, http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=46394 (“The practical 
effect and future enforceability of such a provision is unknown since the 
MedImmune license did not include this provision and the Supreme Court did 
not address this issue.”). 
27 Timm & McQuillen, supra note 26 (emphasis added); see also Richard B. 
Smith, Licensees May Be Getting a New Legal Weapon, GENETIC ENGINEERING 
NEWS, March 1, 2007, 
http://www.genengnews.com/articles/chitem.aspx?aid=2018 (“The 
enforceability of such provisions, however, is still an open question in light of 
the strong public policy favoring patent challenges.”). 
28 Smith, supra note 27 (emphasis added); see also Castanias et al., Another 
Change in U.S. Patent Law, JONES DAY, Jan. 2007, 
http://www.jonesday.com/pubs/pubs_detail.aspx?pubID=S3933 (“If such 
provisions are enforceable, then patent owners . . . may consider including such 
provisions in their licensing agreements, thereby ensuring that licensees will not 
be able to take advantage of their immunity from an infringement suit while 
simultaneously pursuing invalidity challenges.”). 
29 A. Jose Cortina, TechLaw: Is MedImmune a Licensing Minefield?, WRAL 
LOCALTECHWIRE.COM, Jan. 31, 2007, 
http://www.localtechwire.com/business/local_tech_wire/opinion/story/1184908. 
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and termination of the agreement, permitting the patent holder to bring its 
own infringement claim against the licensee.30 
2. Prohibiting declaratory judgment actions in certain circumstances 
¶12 An alternative to estopping licensees from challenging licensed 
patents at all stages of the license is prohibiting challenges by licensees only 
once they meet certain criteria.  Examples of criteria listed by practitioners 
include “enjoying the benefits of the license for a certain period of time, or 
paying a cumulative amount of royalties, or introducing another patented 
product, or the patent is successfully asserted against a third party.”31 
¶13 Without enforceable provisions protecting patent holders, licensees 
could, for instance, create improvements on the licensed patent and then 
challenge the original patent’s validity once those rights no longer hold any 
potential value.  In this situation, the licensee not only supplants the original 
patent’s utility by patenting an improvement on the original, but also may 
be granted a refund on royalty payments made for the use of those rights.  
Thus, while the enforceability of this particular type of provision has yet to 
be addressed post-MedImmune, courts may consider enforcing such 
provisions to prevent licensees from abusing their new MedImmune power. 
3. Increasing royalty rates upon declaratory judgment actions 
¶14 It is possible that a provision imposing increased royalties on a 
licensee exercising its right to challenge a patent may be enforced when the 
pre-filing rate could be considered a discount reflecting the uncertainty of 
the patent’s validity—in accordance with the understood functioning of 
patent licenses.32  However, if the variance in rates is too great, a court may 
                                                     
30 Peter Kaplan, U.S. High Court Reinstates MedImmune Patent Suit, REUTERS, 
Jan. 9, 2007, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/companyNewsAndPR/idUSN094809272007010
9 (suggesting MedImmune “could prompt patent owners to put conditions in 
their licenses that trigger immediate termination when a patent’s validity is 
challenged”). 
31 Michael D. McCoy, Kevin A. O’Brien & George M. Taulbee, Supreme Court 
Eases Bar for Licensees to Challenge Licensed Patents: So . . . What Do You Do 
as a Licensee? Licensor?, ALSTON + BIRD LLP, Jan. 31, 2007, 
http://www.alston.com/files/Publication/09a368d1-e0c4-4763-8e60-
21c20e4d30e2/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/b1da8282-9414-4262-a0aa-
caf4af5ab3dd/MedImmune%20Advisory.pdf. 
32 Clarisa Long, MedImmune v. Genentech: What’s Left Standing?, Speech at 
Duke University School of Law’s Sixth Annual Hot Topics in Intellectual 
Property Law Symposium (Feb. 23, 2007) (recording on file with the Duke Law 
and Technology Review); see also supra text accompanying notes 7-8. 
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view the post-filing rate as a penalty on licensees for exercising their 
Declaratory Judgment Act rights.33 
¶15 Furthermore, while the Supreme Court was hesitant to enforce 
explicit requirements imposing royalty obligations on licensees throughout 
the course of litigation,34 future license agreements could experiment with 
creative methods of exacting royalty payments.  For example, patent holders 
could incorporate provisions prohibiting licensees from paying royalty 
payments under protest, making it more difficult for licensees to recover 
those payments. 
¶16 Instead of punishing licensees for challenging patents, patent 
holders could reward licensees for refraining from challenging patents.  
One method patent holders could use to issue rewards would be to place a 
portion of each royalty payment into a litigation fund accumulating 
throughout the term of the license.  The fund is available for patent holders 
to defend themselves against licensees’ challenges, but if at the end of the 
license term no challenges have been raised, the entirety of the fund is 
returned to the licensee. 
4. Imposing procedural impediments to declaratory judgment actions 
¶17 Procedural impediments available to patent holders for deterring 
licensee challenges include mandatory arbitration, holding the licensee 
responsible for payment of associated legal costs, or establishing the 
licensor’s freedom to bring the action in a licensor-favorable forum.35  Even 
if these provisions are not effective in deterring challenges, they will reduce 
the burden on patent holders forced to defend their patent rights. 
B. Arguments For and Against Enforceability 
¶18 Acknowledging the underlying policy arguments that often govern 
enforceability of the contractual provisions described above, Justice Souter 
called the issue "a question of line drawing under Article III.”36  Where the 
courts decide to draw the line will be critical to the terms of future license 
                                                     
33 Long, supra note 32, see also supra text accompanying notes 7-8. 
34 See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 673 (1969). 
35 Lawrence M. Sung, License to Sue?  The Availability of Declaratory 
Judgment Actions to Patent Licensees After MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, 
Inc., INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Jan. 2007, 
http://www.iptoday.com/pdf/2007/1/Sung-Jan2007.pdf. 
36 High Court Hears Arguments in Dispute over Licensees' Rights to Challenge 
Patents, 14-10 MEALEY'S LITIG. REP: PATENTS 1, 2 (2006) [hereinafter High 
Court] (“And your argument is you want to draw the line, the way you want it 
drawn, primarily because there are practical reasons to favor a public policy of 
free challenge.”). 
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agreements and to the conduct of licensing patent holders and their 
licensees. 
¶19 Some commentators believe “federal patent law should not preempt 
operative contracts,” on the basis that preemption “adversely affect[s] patent 
licensing, which fosters competition and economic growth and efficiency by 
making technology and intellectual property more widely available.” 37  
Accordingly, commentators speculated that certain license provisions 
prohibiting licensees from raising challenges may be invalidated on antitrust 
grounds.38 
¶20 With respect to provisions completely prohibiting validity 
challenges, the Court held that “Lear does not prevent the[ir] enforceability 
. . . where that promise is made in connection with settling pending 
litigation involving the patent.”39  However, when the Court considered 
whether it should grant MedImmune standing, it expressed concern that, 
“even if [we] granted permission to sue, Genentech would insist 
MedImmune sign away the right in order to keep the license . . . .”40 
¶21 Pessimism about the prospect of courts enforcing this type of 
provision stems from the notion that, “[w]ith the growing tensions about 
patents in society, . . . such provisions could result in antitrust or public 
policy challenges and the establishment of further Supreme Court 
precedent.”41  Justice Kennedy himself acknowledged that even if 
prohibitory language was given recognition, “we may not be talking about 
                                                     
37 Columbia Brief, supra note 9, at 19; see also Neil M. Goodman, Patent 
Licensee Standing and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 186, 
206 (Jan. 1983) (“If current licensees are allowed to bring offensive patent 
validity challenges, the patent system may be injured.  Injury to the patent 
system may in turn harm our long-standing policy of promoting invention, and 
may ultimately reduce both competition and technological advance.”). 
38 Raymond Van Dyke, Supreme Court Signals Balance Shift in Licensing 
Patents, E-COMMERCE TIMES, Jan. 10, 2007, 
http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/55085.html. 
39 Castanias et al., supra note 21; but see Sung, supra note 35 (explaining that 
contract provisions seeking to deter licensee challenges will be “subject to the 
Lear v. Adkins prohibition against estopping patent licensees from raising 
invalidity contentions”). 
40 MedImmune Wants to Sue; Asks Supreme Court for Permission even Though 
it Is up to Date on License Payments, 25 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 685, 685 
(Dec. 2006). 
41 See Cortina, supra note 29 (“[W]hile the Courts of the United States have 
traditionally favored private agreements between parties as a way of avoiding 
litigation, such a suggestion seems to fly in the face of [a] policy . . . [of] 
avoidance of limitations on the ability to challenge a patent’s validity.”). 
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much.  It's just going to be boilerplate in every license agreement, and that's 
the end of it."42 
¶22 However, courts could still enforce these provisions.  If they do, it 
is possible that MedImmune will hardly have any impact on license 
agreements; “the issue here may be mooted . . . as companies rewrite their 
agreements to handle licensee patent challenges.”43  Widespread 
enforcement could also forestall MedImmune’s effects on litigation, 
particularly the projected increase in patent litigation.44 
III.  POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS 
¶23 Current and potential parties to license agreements have large 
stakes riding on courts’ decisions regarding the enforceability of various 
contract provisions.  This Section addresses the potential impact of the 
lower courts’ decisions regarding enforceability on “the relationship 
between licensors and licensees, the willingness of companies to enter into 
licenses and the way licenses are written.”45 
A. Patent Applications 
¶24 MedImmune may have “creat[ed] a federal court mechanism for 
what essentially amounts to a post-grant opposition to an issued patent by a 
competitor with the benefit of access to the patented technology but without 
the fear of reprisal for challenging the patent” with its decision in 
MedImmune.46  Given that “[l]icensees may often be the only individuals 
with enough economic incentive to challenge the patentability of an 
inventor’s discovery,” the power to challenge a patent’s validity becomes 
particularly detrimental to patent holders when put in the hands of their 
licensees.47 
¶25 Thus, if courts find provisions prohibiting patent challenges largely 
unenforceable, effectively clearing the path for licensees to challenge 
                                                     
42 Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, MedImmune v. Genentech, 127 S. Ct. 764 
(2007) (No. 05-608), Oct. 4, 2007, quoted in High Court, supra note 36. 
43 Van Dyke, supra note 38. 
44 See Walter Hanchuk & Thomas E. Riley, Supreme Court Decision Allows a 
Patent Licensee to Dispute the Patent and Seek a DJ Without First Breaching 
the Patent License, MONDAQ, Feb. 12, 2007, 
http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=46002 (“Others, however, have 
suggested that the Supreme Court decision implies that a contractual prohibition 
against challenging the validity of a patent may effectively prevent a licensee 
from bringing a DJ action.”). 
45 High Court, supra note 36, at 1. 
46 Sung, supra note 35. 
47 MedImmune v. Genentech, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28678 at *16-17 (C.D. 
Cal. Apr. 23, 2004) (citing Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969)). 
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patents, MedImmune may have created a powerful judicial mechanism for 
challenging patents.  Shifting some power from the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (the “PTO”) to the federal courts may create a healthy 
rivalry between the PTO and the courts, which could generally improve 
patent quality.48  Whereas many corporations previously sacrificed quality 
for quantity by obtaining patents in bulk, this imminent threat of declaratory 
judgment suits may now push them to invest in higher quality patents.49 
B. Patent Licenses 
¶26 Patent holders always had to balance stating their patent rights 
affirmatively (in order to encourage others to license their patents) without 
being too aggressive (in order to avoid declaratory judgments).  
MedImmune robs patent holders of their ability to bargain for immunity 
from declaratory judgments through licensing and may beget “fewer 
licenses and more challenges to patents [since] the patent owner has his 
hands tied behind his back."50 
¶27 MedImmune “turns all fundamental assumptions about the stability 
and finality of a patent license completely on their head,” and since license 
terms are decided almost entirely through negotiations, those assumptions 
could completely transform the licensing arena.51  This Section describes 
the considerations facing patent holders as they determine whether or not 
they should license their rights, and if so, the terms they should seek to 
impose in the agreement. 
1. Availability 
                                                     
48 See Long, supra note 32 (pointing to the desirability of encouraging rivalry 
between the courts and the PTO).  Citing the escalations in the number of 
patents granted per year and an assortment of theories regarding the PTO’s 
flawed system, patent scholars have long expressed their desire for additional 
venues for patent challenges. See Stuart Minor Benjamin and Arti K. Rai, Who's 
Afraid of the APA? What the Patent System Can Learn from Administrative 
Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 316-17, Jan. 2007 (discussing deficiencies in the 
structure of the Patent and Trademark Office).  However, other commentators 
speculate that the potential new mechanism is an “unintended consequence” of 
the decision and may “warrant legislative consideration and response.”  Sung, 
supra note 35. 
49 Long, supra note 32. 
50 Marcia Coyle, High Court Patent Case May Have Profound Business Impact, 
THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, October 3, 2006, available at 
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1159792526842 (last visited Nov. 9, 
2007). 
51 Having it Both Ways, THE PATENT PROSPECTOR, Jan. 9, 2007, 
http://www.patenthawk.com/blog/2007/01/having_it_both_ways_1.html. 
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¶28 While “[l]icensees may be more willing to enter into patent 
licenses, since doing so will not limit their ability to challenge a licensed 
patent,” patent holders, having lost “the quid pro quo in the arrangement,” 
will probably be less willing, especially if contractual prohibitions or 
deterrents to challenges are not upheld.52 
¶29 Since the Court’s decision supplies licensees, not potential 
licensees, with leverage, patent holders may try to preserve their abilities to 
bring infringement claims and to shield themselves from declaratory 
judgment actions by simply not licensing their rights.  Corporations with 
substantial patent rights may want to avoid licensee challenges by 
integrating vertically instead of extending licenses to competitors.  Non-
commercial enterprises, such as research universities, may also refrain from 
licensing if they do not have the financial resources to cover their potential 
litigation costs.53 
¶30 A decrease in the number of licenses will ultimately hinder 
innovation, which requires disaggregation and licensing.54  Moreover, 
vertical integration often prevents products from reaching the market.55  
Even more, non-commercial enterprises rely on licensees “to make their 
useful, patented inventions available to the public,” so their resistance to 
licensing “could remove many important technological inventions from 
public availability.”56 
2. Royalty Rates 
¶31 Royalty rates in pre-MedImmune licenses generally “reflect[ed] 
assessments of likely litigation outcomes: more than if the licensee were to 
prevail in court; less than if the patentee were to prevail in court.”57  
Royalty rates could increase if courts prevent patent holders from using 
licenses to protect themselves from declaratory judgment suits because, 
without the ability to use the license as protection, there is no incentive to 
                                                     
52 Barquist and Crotty, supra note 17; Van Dyke, supra note 38; see also 
Richard A. Epstein, Patent’s Downward Spiral, THE FINANCIAL TIMES, July 19, 
2006, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/09a2a554-1720-11db-abad-
0000779e2340.html. 
53 Columbia Brief, supra note 9, at 20; Long, supra note 32. 
54 Long, supra note 32. 
55 Id. 
56 Robin M. Davis and Khara Ashlynn Tusa, Patent, Declaratory Judgment, 
Licensee Estoppel, Justiciable, Breach of License Agreement, CORNELL LEGAL 
INFORMATION INSTITUTE, http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/05-608.html 
(last visited Nov. 9, 2007). 
57 Id. (emphasis added). 
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discount royalty rates.58  If, however, patent holders can contractually 
prevent licensee challenges, the licensees’ newfound power may serve as an 
“added arrow in their quivers to use in the negotiation process.”59  Patent 
holders may then continue, as they did before MedImmune, to discount 
royalty rates to “try to reduce the likelihood of a challenge.”60 
¶32 Licensees paying extortionate royalty rates have a greater economic 
incentive to challenge the underlying patents than those paying reasonable 
or discounted rates.  However, since treble damages are a function of 
royalty rates, those same licensees also have the potential to lose more if the 
patent holder prevails.61  Thus, commentators do not agree about whether 
royalty rates will collectively increase or decrease.  The rate may depend on 
the function of the likelihood the licensee will challenge the patent and the 
likelihood of the licensee prevailing in such a challenge. 
¶33 MedImmune might also alter payment structures of royalties.  Most 
commentators believe that patent holders will require payments in lump 
sum and upfront, rather than incrementally spread out over the entire term 
of the patent, due to their growing wariness toward their licensees.62  This 
                                                     
58 See Barquist and Crotty, supra note 17 (“MedImmune may cause licensors to 
demand higher royalties because the incentive to compromise is reduced if the 
licensor knows that the license is not a final resolution, but rather that the 
licensee can simply turn around and file a declaratory judgment action 
challenging the validity of the patent or whether it is used, or infringed, at all.”); 
Is anything ever final? MedImmune v. Genentech, PATENT MONKEY, Jan. 10, 
2007, 
http://www.patentmonkey.com/PM/IMTBlog/tabid/63/EntryID/17/Default.aspx 
(“Patent holders demand higher royalties as a means to imbed the costs of future 
challenges.”). 
59 George R. McGuire, New Arrow for Licensees’ Quivers—Supreme Court 
Changes Balance of Power with Licensors, BOND, SCHOENECK & KING, PLLC, 
Jan. 2007, http://www.bsk.com/archives/infomemo.dbm?StoryID=787; see Bill 
Warren, Ann G. Fort and Kathryn H. Wade, U.S. Supreme Court Facilitates 
Ability to Challenge Patent Validity, MONDAQ, Jan. 23, 2007, 
http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=45718 (“Licensees will use their 
new power as a means to renegotiate more favorable license terms.”). 
60 Stephen Albainy-Jenei, Supreme Court High-Fives MedImmune, PATENT 
BARISTAS, Jan. 10, 2007, 
http://patentbaristas.com/archives/2007/01/10/supreme-court-high-fives-
medimmune. 
61 See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006) (“Upon finding for the claimant the court shall 
award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement but in 
no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the 
infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by the court . . . . [T]he court 
may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed.”). 
62 Long, supra note 32; see also Cortina, supra note 29 (“[L]icensors can avoid 
problems by refusing to enter into agreements requiring running royalties and 
2007 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW No. 8 
could hinder the growth of small companies that are unable to procure large 
fees in their early development stages.63  Also, since many useful 
technologies are licensed by universities for relatively small financial 
returns, the prospect of expensive patent litigation could raise the cost of 
making these inventions available to the public.64 
C. Patent Litigation 
¶34 Before MedImmune, patent licensees were required to break their 
agreements before they were allowed to challenge underlying patents; they 
generally were hesitant to bring challenges to avoid being sued by the patent 
holder.65  MedImmune gives licensees the gifts of preemptive engagement 
and forum selection, and the advantage of “steer[ing] the course of litigation 
and concurrent out-of-court business negotiations.”66  This “procedural 
ability after MedImmune of a licensee to avail itself of a declaratory 
judgment suit in an advantageous forum [could trigger] an increased 
incidence of licensee challenges on presently licensed patents.”67 
                                                                                                                       
instead require a lump sum payment based on net present value of a running 
royalty.”); Sung, supra note 35 (“[L]icensors in the post-MedImmune era might 
be encouraged to seek lump-sum, paid-up or other front-loaded royalties.”). 
63 Cortina, supra note 29 (“This would . . . prevent many small companies from 
being able to enter into license agreements because of a lack of resources to pay 
large up-front fees.”). 
64 Columbia Brief, supra note 9, at 20. 
65 Steve Johnson, Genentech Loses Patent Dispute with MedImmune, MERCURY 
NEWS, Feb. 21, 2007, http://www.mercurynews.com/search/ci_5279391. 
66 Id.; see id. at 465-66 (“[A] competitor or alleged infringer is much more likely 
to win when it selects the forum . . . . The patentee wins 58% of the claims when 
it selects the forum by suing for infringement but only 44% when the competitor 
selects the forum by filing a declaratory judgment action.”). 
67 Sung, supra note 35; see also McGuire, supra note 59 (noting that 
MedImmune is “certain to spark a rise in suits being filed by licensees who 
believe they are being coerced into paying royalties”).  Patent holders also may 
be more inclined to seek final judgments of patent validity through litigation, 
since they would be less likely to settle their potential grievances with 
competitors through licenses.  Van Dyke, supra note 38.  Prospective licensors 
may even feel compelled, before entering into a license, to file suit against the 
potential licensee and propose the license as a settlement that would then have 
res judicata effect.  Commentators have predicted a rise in “so-called friendly 
lawsuits between a licensor and licensee, where a patent holder brings a suit 
against a licensee with the consent of the licensee.  Id.; see also Benjamin and 
Rai, supra note 48, at 328 (discussing the rigorous examination process as an 
alternative venue for patent holders seeking validation).  Commentators, 
particularly Genentech’s supporters, have voiced their concern about the waste 
of judicial resources these “friendly lawsuits” would promote.  Columbia Brief, 
supra note 9,at 29.  The purpose here would be to validate the licensed patent by 
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¶35 Furthermore, before MedImmune, a licensee raising a challenge to a 
patent that was part of a multi-patent license agreement would have to risk 
the entire license to challenge even one of the patents.68  Now these 
licensees can come forth and challenge those individual patents while still 
preserving their entire agreement. 
CONCLUSION 
¶36 The new twist in patent licensing and litigation that MedImmune 
provoked will certainly have a tangible effect on the number and substance 
of courtroom proceedings.  However, given the number of open questions 
yet to be decided by the courts and the variety of factors involved, the exact 
form and degree of the effect is uncertain.  Even more unpredictable is the 
future of patent license agreements as they respond to the new federal 
standing requirement.  The availability and terms of license agreements will 
depend on their respective value to each party.  Their values will likely be 
governed by the enforceability of provisions attempting to restore the pre-
MedImmune licensing environment. 
¶37 Aside from its effect on patent licenses, the variety of amicus curiae 
supporting both sides of the case reveals that MedImmune’s impact will 
reach far beyond the patent world; the decision has already been cited in 
several non-IP cases as a basis for granting standing to plaintiffs seeking 
declaratory relief.69  With its decision in MedImmune, the Court is keeping 
                                                                                                                       
a judgment, “thereby strengthening the patent against subsequent invalidity 
assertions by others.”  Van Dyke, supra note 38. 
68 Barquist & Crotty, supra note 17.  It is speculated that owners of 
biotechnology patents may face a greater risk of declaratory judgment actions, 
“since they are particularly vulnerable to written description and enablement 
challenges under 35 U.S.C. §112.”  Id. 
69 MedImmune has been cited in favor of plaintiffs challenging an insurance 
claim, Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Kline & Son Cement Repair, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 12609 at *11-12 (E.D. Va. Feb. 12, 2007), an employee medical 
treatment act, BNSF Railway Company v. Charles E. Box, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 3563 at *24 (C.D. Ill. 2007), and a sexual predator punishment act, Doe 
v. Schwarzenegger, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12352 at *14 n.8 (D. Cal. 2007); 
Coyle, supra note 36 (“The high stakes are reflected by the amicus parties in the 
case. The Bush administration, generic drug makers, and environmental groups 
who believe the decision could have impact beyond the patent field, are among 
those supporting MedImmune.”). See Barquist & Crotty, supra note 17 (“The 
MedImmune decision will have an impact not only on the law regarding 
declaratory judgment actions by licensees, but also on the Federal Circuit’s 
declaratory judgment jurisprudence generally.”); Hanchuk & Riley, supra note 
44 (“Some have also suggested that the instant decision may affect the ability to 
dispute various non IP-related contracts.”).  Nonetheless, other courts confronted 
with MedImmune avoided addressing the question.  See, e.g., Hydril Co. v. 
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patent holders anxiously anticipating the courts’ determination of what, if 
any, measures they can take to protect their patents from challenges.  Given 
the high stakes, it should not be long until courts are faced with disputes 
over post-MedImmune license agreements and patent holders will be more 
assured about the scope of their abilities to contract around MedImmune. 
                                                                                                                       
Grant Prideco LP, 474 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (disclaiming the need to 
address MedImmune); WS Packaging Group v. Global Commerce Group, LLC, 
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5187 at *8 n.3 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 24, 2007) (leaving the 
decision of whether or not to reexamine the declaratory judgment standard to the 
discretion of the Federal Circuit). 
